ANC, EFF and MKP manipulation of historical realities to suit their modern socialist narratives

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The ANC, EFF, and MKP all advocate for radical land reform in South Africa, primarily focusing on Expropriation Without Compensation (EWC) and state custodianship, though they differ on the speed and mechanism. The MKP pushes to extend land claims back to 1652 and nationalize all land. The EFF demands immediate constitutional amendment for state ownership. And, the ANC favours the recently passed Expropriation Act while balancing coalition commitments.

Are they justified in their demands?

The fulcrum of their justification is the Natives Land Act No. 27 of 1913, passed on June 19, 1913, was a cornerstone of segregation in South Africa that restricted black land ownership to just 7% of the country's total area, while leaving 87% for the white minority. It prohibited buying or renting land outside designated reserves, forced thousands into poverty, and created a massive, lasting economic inequality.

Black people were prohibited from buying or hiring land from white individuals outside of the designated “homelands.” The Act led to the mass eviction of black families (tenant farmers) from land they had worked for generations, driving them into overcrowded, impoverished homelands or turning them into farm labourers. It intended to make black people dependent on the white economy, crippling their independence and ability to farm successfully.

So, what land was actually “owned” by Black people prior to 1913?

While the first official nationwide census across South Africa was not taken until 1904, census data at the time suggests the population, of all ethnic groups, was roughly 4.71 million people. The map below roughly shows the areas where different language groups were found.



What the map does not show is where the Khoisan people were forced to move to with Blacks pushing down from the north and the Whites pushing up from the south. Khoisan rock paintings are found in the Limpopo, Mpumalanga, KwaZulu Natal, Free State and Eastern Cape provinces of South Africa, as well as the Western Cape.

The Khoisan, comprising the San (hunter-gatherers) and Khoikhoi (pastoralists), are recognized as one of the oldest continuous populations in human history, having inhabited southern Africa for at least 100,000 to over 150,000 years. So, in truth, South Africa belongs to the Khoisan people, not the Blacks and not the Whites who, with their northern and southern migrations happening, forced the Khoisan to flee to the Northern Cape, southeast Namibia and southwest Botswana, with one exception. The assimilation of an Eastern Cape Khoisan group by the Xhosa people that is a foundational aspect of Xhosa history, culture, and genetics.

The Nguni peoples (ancestors to the Zulu, Xhosa, Swazi, and Ndebele) migrated into present-day South Africa in waves, with early groups arriving around 100 CE to 200 CE, followed by larger, more established migrations around 1400 CE,

reaching eThekwini around 1500 CE. They were part of the wider Bantu migration from East Africa, settling primarily in the eastern part of South Africa.

The Xhosa, a southern Nguni group, settled in the Eastern Cape by the 16th century. Upon their arrival, they interacted with the existing San populations, adopting "click" sounds into their languages. These groups formed small, independent clan-based communities before the expansion of the Zulu Kingdom in the early 19th century.

The Xhosa did not formally "break away" from the Zulu in a single event, but rather diverged centuries earlier as part of the broader Nguni migration into southern Africa, settling in the Eastern Cape well before the Zulu Kingdom was formed. The groups shared common ancestors (aBeNguni). Ancestral Xhosa groups moved south from KwaZulu-Natal around the 15th to 17th centuries, while the Zulu kingdom emerged much later, rising to power under Shaka in the early 19th century.

During Shaka's rise, the Mfecane wars forced various clans (such as the AmaMfengu) to flee the Zulu kingdom and seek refuge among the Xhosa, but these groups were incorporated into existing Xhosa society rather than being a "breakaway" of the Xhosa themselves. The Xhosa became a distinct entity through their early migration, adaptation to the Eastern Cape, and adoption of click sounds from the assimilated Khoisan, making them ethnically and linguistically distinct from the Zulu. While they are both Nguni-speaking peoples, their separation was a gradual process of migration, not a political secession.

The Sotho and Nguni are not the same group, but they are closely related branches of the same broader Bantu-speaking migration. While they share distant ancestry and cultural similarities, they are recognized as distinct ethnic and linguistic divisions in South Africa, alongside the Shangaan-Tsonga and Venda.

The ancestors of the Sotho-Tswana people began migrating into present-day South Africa from East Africa around 200–500 CE, with established settlements of Sotho-speaking ironworkers documented as early as the 8th to 11th centuries. They expanded across the region by 1500 CE, with distinct clusters (North, South, and West) emerging over time. Archaeological evidence indicates Sotho-speaking ironworkers were at Phalaborwa by the 8th century and Melville Koppies (Johannesburg) by the 11th century. By 1500, they had settled across areas that are now Gauteng, the North West Province, the Free State, and Botswana.

The modern Southern Sotho (Basotho) identity solidified in the 19th century under King Moshoeshoe I, who brought together various groups during the Difaqane/Mfecane era. The specific kingdom of Lesotho was established later, with its borders finalized by the British in the 1869 Convention of Aliwal North. The ancestors of the Sotho-Tswana people are believed to have originated from East Africa, likely from the area that is now Tanzania.

Post-1994 land claims

As of early 2026, approximately 83,000 to 83,614 land claims have been settled in South Africa, covering around 94% of the valid claims lodged before the 1998 cut-off date. The restitution process has restored roughly 3.9 million hectares of land to beneficiaries, involving more than 465,000 households at a cost of over R52 billion. Around 5,700 land claims remain outstanding, according to reports in 2025.

Combined with redistribution, about 11% of commercial farmland as it stood in 1994 has been transferred. KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo, and Mpumalanga have the highest backlogs, while most settled claims initially occurred in urban areas. The Mala Mala game reserve claim (13,184 ha) is one of the most prominent, highlighting the complexity of high-value agricultural and conservation land restitution.

Approximately 90% to 92% of land restitution claimants in South Africa have chosen financial compensation over the physical restoration of land. This is an important statistic to keep in mind.

Expropriation without compensation

President Cyril Ramaphosa signed the Expropriation Act 13 of 2025 in January 2025, allowing the state to expropriate land without compensation when "just and equitable," such as for abandoned, speculative, or unused land. This law aims to accelerate land reform, though it requires negotiations first and faces legal challenges from opposition parties, with implementation pending final gazetting.

This new act replaces the 1975 Act to provide a uniform framework for expropriation in the public interest, allowing for "nil" compensation. Nil compensation applies when the land is abandoned, unused, held for speculative purposes, or if the state previously invested in it, making it "just and equitable". However, the law requires the state to try to reach an agreement on compensation first, adhering to section 25 of the Constitution (as amended in 2025).

The Zimbabwe experience

Beginning in 2000, Zimbabwe's government, led by Robert Mugabe, initiated radical, often violent, land reforms, seizing roughly 4,000 white-owned commercial farms to redistribute to black Zimbabweans. The removal of experienced farmers disrupted the farming sector, turning some large commercial enterprises into unproductive or

neglected land. Many productive farms were not distributed to landless individuals but were taken by elite political officials and allies of the president. The policy aimed to rectify colonial-era land disparities, but resulted in an economic collapse, agricultural production failure, and enduring legal challenges.

Communist nationalisation of the land

Communist land nationalisation involves the state seizing private land without compensation to create a centrally managed, socialist system, often turning private farms into state-owned or forced collective farms. Rooted in Marxist theory, this abolishes private property, aiming to eliminate class distinctions, with the state acting as custodian of the land.

As history records, collective farming is generally considered an economic failure in terms of productivity and efficiency, often leading to severe agricultural crises and famine.

The nationalisation of land and collective farming (communal villages) in Mozambique, after Independence on 25 June 1975, did not succeed. These policies resulted in drastic declines in agricultural production, food shortages, and failed to improve rural welfare. The state-led, socialist model was abandoned in the 1980s following an economic collapse.

ANC, EFF and MKP expropriation without compensation rhetoric

The African National Congress (ANC), Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), and uMkhonto weSizwe Party (MKP) all officially support the Expropriation of Land Without Compensation (EWC) in South Africa, but their rhetoric differs in radicalism, urgency, and proposed implementation methods. As of early 2026, the rhetoric surrounding EWC is highly charged, aiming to win over voters frustrated with the slow pace of land reform.

The ANC maintains that it is fundamentally pro-expropriation of land without compensation, aiming to fulfil the mandate of the Freedom Charter. While in favour of EWC, the ANC historically prefers to implement it within a constitutional framework, leading to friction with more radical parties. However, top officials have reiterated that they have "never deviated" from the position of EWC. The ANC faces internal pressure from hardliners demanding faster land reform, while navigating its position within the Government of National Unity (GNU).

The EFF pushes for the most radical form of EWC, aiming to remove land ownership entirely from private hands and vest it in the state, which would act as the custodian of all land. The EFF uses rhetoric highlighting that EWC is essential to reclaim land from white minority ownership and eliminate "white monopoly capital". The party frames EWC as a non-negotiable step for economic emancipation and often criticizes the ANC for being too slow and "cowardly" in implementing it.

The MKP has proposed a total, radical restructuring of land ownership, moving away from freehold title to a system where all land is held under the joint custodianship of the state and traditional leadership. The MKP specifically pushes for amending the constitution to facilitate immediate and wide-scale EWC. MKP rhetoric argues that its approach will stop land speculation and prevent foreign ownership while accelerating agriculture for black people. The MKP aligns its rhetoric with the EFF in challenging the current economic system, often describing the current system as a failure since 1994.

Now, in April 2026, the uMkhonto weSizwe Party (MKP) proposes radical changes to South Africa's land reform policy, which includes backdating the allowable period for land restitution claims from June 1913 to April 1652 when Jan van Riebeck arrived in the Cape of Good Hope.

Is EWC motivated by greed and/or ideology?

Whether the call for Expropriation Without Compensation (EWC) in South Africa is motivated solely by "greed" or rather by political ideology, desperation, or a desire for deeper social transformation is a subject of intense debate. While over 94% of "old-order" land claims lodged before the 1998 deadline have been settled, with a high proportion settled via financial compensation, opponents and proponents view this context very differently.

Critics argue that the government has failed to achieve its 30% land redistribution target, and focusing on EWC is a way to deflect from poor planning, lack of funding, and corruption. Some analysts, including those from the Institute of Race Relations (IRR), argue that EWC is a "sinister" attempt to change the property rights regime, driven by ideology rather than actual demand for farming land, which they claim is low.

There is concern that many land claims, while technically "settled" (especially those paid out in cash), have not resulted in productive land ownership, leading to failed projects rather than wealth creation. Concerns also exist that EWC legislation could be used to penalize people who are victims of land invasions or those who sell property for profit, treating the pursuit of profit as a potential crime.

The arguments supporting the call for EWC claim that financial compensation does not restore the dignity or the ancestral land taken from black citizens during apartheid, which is the primary goal of land reform. The government has also bemoaned that the high cost of acquiring land through the "willing buyer, willing seller" principle, which

requires market-based compensation, has slowed down the restitution process. And, despite the 94% already settled, 5700 land claims remain unresolved. Furthermore, proponents argue that white South Africans still own the vast majority of land, and EWC is necessary to correct this historical imbalance swiftly. This of course is not true. White individuals own approximately 22% of the total land area in South Africa.

The Department of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development (DALRRD), along with the Commission on Restitution of Land Rights (CRLR), reports indicate that 92% of settled claims were settled through financial compensation rather than returning the land. Research has shown that, while many claims were settled with money, this does not represent the same level of economic empowerment as land ownership, which is why the pressure for "land" remains high. Just giving land to Black recipients without agricultural training and financial assistance to get their agricultural businesses off the ground and sustained is not empowerment. While studies show that a large majority of South Africans, both black and white, prioritize economic growth and jobs over EWC, Blacks don't see agriculture as a way to earn good money. Their entrepreneurial skills are also missing, due to a lack of training. 97& of South Africans have an external "Locus of Control", which means they are followers and not self-motivated, self-driven and/or entrepreneurial.

In conclusion

From the 1904 census and the language dominance map, the western half of South Africa cannot be claimed by any Black tribes, only by Khoisan, Coloureds and Whites. And, not all the land in the Eastern half of South Africa can be claimed given the pockets of Whites who occupied land prior to 1913. In addition, land already claimed and paid for by the government excludes land not claimed, with the exception of the 5700 claims that are still outstanding. Any claim to the contrary is motivated by greed and hatred.

As to the EFF and MKP communist ideology, they don't just want to nationalise all land, they want to nationalise all the banks and all the means of production – every manufacturing company is South Africa.

The question is, will Whites just roll over and accept being subjugated into poverty by people who are brainwashed by failed ideologies and have not learned from the mistakes of other countries. How many people, families, must die before action is taken. Neither the USA or Russia can absorb 4,4 million White refugees who will be expected to be economically contributing members of those societies. The 1,275 million whites over 60-years-of-age, unless supported by family, will not be allowed to be a drain on the host economy. Do you then leave them alone to face the hatred of the ANC, EFF and MKP?

The apathy of Whites prior to 1994 to oppose apartheid is the same apathy post 1994 to stand up and fight for their human rights as enshrined in the SA Constitution. If they do nothing, then they won't be able to blame anyone but themselves.

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